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By GEoRGE R. Co.%N*t
No SINGLE piece of legislation in recent years has raised greater
problems of administration for local school officials than the 1961
amendments to those California Education Code provisions relating to
dismissal of probationary teachers.' The purpose of this paper is to
discuss in some detail the legal relations of parties involved in such a
dismissal situation, namely, the probationary teacher on the one hand
and the groups and persons representing the school district which em-
ploys the teacher on the other.
A necessary preliminary to an understanding of this subject is
an appreciation of the employment context in which a probationary
teacher functions. A description of this context begins with, and will
herein be confined to, the statutes authorizing the teacher employment
relationship. In California, these statutes are found in the Education
Code.
A teacher is employed by a local educational agency, a local govern-
ing board.2 This agency may be the governing board of a union or
joint union district,8 an elementary school district,4 a high school dis-
trict, 5 a junior college district," or a unified district.7 The members are
elected by the people of the district for which the board is responsible.6
* A.B., Pomona College, 1940; LL.B., Hastings College of the Law, 1948; former
Hearing Officer, now Presiding Officer, Office of Administrative Procedure, State of Cal-
ifornia.
t The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of James T. Markle of the Jour-
nal Editorial Board.
1 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13442-44. Detailed provisions of these and related code sec-
tions are set forth in notes and text as their terms are discussed.
2 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13252. See, as to local governing boards generally, CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 901-1153.
3 See CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 1171-74 (general); §§ 1941-2056 (organization).
4 See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 1231-303 (general); §§ 2131-73 (organization).
5 See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 1321-92 (general); §§ 2201-512 (organization).
6 See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 1401-51 (general); §§ 2551-785 (organization).
7 See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 1481-93 (general); §§ 2811-931 (unification of districts).
8 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 937, 939, 952.
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The board may be described as "quasi-autonomous"; that is, in the
words of the statute,
The governing board of any school district shall:
(a) Prescribe and enforce rules not inconsistent with law or with
the rules prescribed by the State Board of Education, for its own gov-
ernment, and for the government of the schools under its jurisdic-
tion.9
The italicized portion of this statute indicates a broad restriction upon
the governing board's autonomy and suggests the fact that there exist
other powers, emanating from non-local state agencies and from legis-
lation, which may lawfully influence the local board's activities. These
state educational agencies include the State Board of Education, 10 the
State Department of Education," and the State Council of Educational
Planning and Co-ordination. 12 The State Superintendent of Public
Instruction may also exert influence upon the local board's governing
of schools within a given district.' 3 And, in addition to state agencies,
the County Board of Education 4 and the County Superintendent of
Schools, 1 representing the county, qua county, within which the school
district is located, may be a source of influence upon the district schools'
government. Finally, the local governing board is restricted in its exer-
cise of power by the "law" itself, which here primarily means the
provisions of the Education Code. For the most part, the interplay
and co-ordination of these variously-origined powers are outside the
scope of this paper.15a However, the law restricting exercise of power
by the local governing board is relevant here to the extent that it is the
source of restrictions upon the particular power of the local governing
board to hire and fire teachers. Thus, it is correlatively the primary 16
source of whatever rights a teacher enjoys, as a teacher, with respect
to his employment.
9 CAL. EDTJC. CODE § 984 (emphasis added).
10 See generally CAL. EDUC CODE §§ 101-58.
21 See generally CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 351-457.
12 See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 501-02.
13 See generally CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 201-302.
14 See generally CaL. EDuc. CODE §§ 601-707.
15 See generally CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 751-857.
3za "There is no general publication on the California school system as a legal or
administrative complex. . . .Generally, however, those involved in California schools
learn by experience and study of the Education Code and Title 5 of the State Adminis-
trative Regulations." Letter from Mr. Garford G. Gordon, Research Executive, Califor-
nia Teachers Association, to the Hastings Law Journal, March 26, 1964.
16 These rights exist, of course, concurrently with common law and statutory em-
ployment contract rights and remedies; the former are in addition to the latter. See
CA.. EDUC. CODE §§ 13439, 13516.5; Beseman v. Remy, 160 Cal. App. 2d 437, 325
P.2d 578 (1958).
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As to the kind of work done, and qualifications therefor, the local
governing board employs two classes of employees: 17 "certified em-
ployees"' s and "classified employees."19 Certified employees are teach-
ers, administrators, and supervisors; that is to say, persons who fill
"educational positions."20 All other employees are classified employ-
ees. 21 This distinction is the basis for one great restriction upon the
local board's autonomy: to fill educational positions, the board may
hire only such persons as meet the educational and administrative re-
quirements prescribed by the Education Code.
22
With respect to tenure, 23 teachers and other certified employees
24
are classed as either "permanent,"2 5 "probationary,"20 "temporary,"2 7
or "substitute."28 A teacher achieves permanent status by (1) being
employed by the district for three complete, consecutive school years
in a position requiring certification qualifications, and (2) being re-
17 See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 12901-4775.
Is See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13101-570.
19 See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13580-756.
20 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 12902, 12907-08.
21 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13580-81.
22 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 12902 and further references contained therein.
2
3 The word "tenure" does not play a prominent role in the Education Code sections
dealing with teachers' employment rights; however, those sections which create such
rights are generally known as teacher tenure acts. See generally 44 CAL. Jun. 2d Schools
§§ 477-531 (1958); Annots., 127 A.L.R. 1298 (1940), 113 A.L.R. 1495 (1938), 110
A.L.R 791 (1937) (these annotations, which are complementary, deal on a national
basis with courts' handling of teacher tenure acts resulting from their great upsurge
in the thirties).
24 Administrators and supervisors in a given district, whether originally employed
in or advanced to such positions, may also gain permanent status upon fulfilling the re-
quirements of CAL. EDUc. CODE § 13304; however, they do not attain permanent status
as administrator or as supervisor but rather as classroom teacher. CAL. EDUc. CODE
§ 13315. Thus, a principal who has achieved tenure as a permanent employee is not
protected in his position by tenure provisions: he may be "demoted" to the position of
classroom teacher. This is not to say, however, that he may not have an action for
damages on his contract of employment as a principal. Board of Educ. v. Swan, 41 Cal.
2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953). The body of case law built up between 1921 and 1935
to the effect that administrators were not entitled to tenure unless they also performed
classroom teacher duties was invalidated by a 1935 amendment to the School Code
predecessor of section 13315. Cases implicitly recognizing this change are Board of
Edue. v. Swan, supra; Holbrook v. Board of Educ., 37 Cal. 2d 316, 231 P.2d 853 (1951).
The court in Griffin v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 53 Cal. App. 2d 350, 127
P.2d 939 (1942), failed to grasp the true import of the 1935 amendment and continued
to rely on the cases which construed a substantially differently worded statute.
25 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13304.
26 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13334.
27 CAL. EDUc. CODE § 13337.
28 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13336. As might be expected, local governing boards are
empowered to summarily dismiss substitute teachers. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13445. This
power is, however, subject to the law of contracts, but there is no tenure law restriction.
See Matthews v. Board of Educ., 198 Cal. App. 2d 748, 18 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1962).
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elected for the next succeeding school year to a position requiring cer-
tification qualifications: after such re-election, the teacher is a perma-
nent employee of the district.29 This permanent status right is created
by operation of law; it matters not whether such status is formally
recognized by the governing board. 80 Many of the tenure rights of the
permanent teacher will necessarily appear in the following discussion
of the tenure rights of the probationary teacher; the purpose of the fore-
going is to furnish background for a meaningful statement of the proba-
tionary teacher's position within the educational system's employment
structure. To summarize, a probationary teacher may be said to be a
certified employee, other than a substitute or temporary employee, of a
given school district, who has not achieved permanent employee status.
Tenure Rights of Probationary Teachers
The word "probation" is defined as "the action of subjecting an
individual to a period of testing and trial so as to be able to ascertain
the individual's fitness or lack of fitness for something (as... retention
of a particular academic classification .. . )."'31 From this statement
the rationale underlying the probationary teacher's employment status
may be inferred. It is obvious that not all persons who meet the state's
minimum requirements for classification as certified employees32 are
29 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13304. Prior to 1961, the mandatory application of this
section was limited to districts having 850 or more average daily attendance ("ADA"-
more fully defined at note 84 infra). By a 1961 amendment mandatory application is
extended to include districts of 250 or more ADA. Classification of certified employees
as permanent by governing boards of districts with less than 250 ADA is discretionary
with the board. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13307. A declaration of legislative intent and pur-
pose in effecting these changes, with emphasis on their retroactive application, is found
in CAL. EDuC. CODE § 13324.5, added in 1962. Governing boards of districts in the
250-850 ADA class should thoroughly familiarize themselves with the provisions of this
section. "The size of 250 ADA was chosen because it is close to the attendance level
which would require eight or more teachers. With this number of teachers a district
may employ a superintendent and thus have professional advice and direction in em-
ploying and evaluating teachers." Letter from Mr. Gordon, supra note 15a. See also
Meyer v. Board of Trustees, 195 Cal. App. 2d 420, 430, 15 Cal. Rptr. 717, 723 (1961).
Although such districts comprise roughly one-third of the state's school districts, it is
estimated that less than eight per cent of the total number of public school teachers
(both permanent and probationary) are employed in such districts. Letter from Mr.
Gordon, supra.
In addition, certain special geographical considerations governed the applicability
of mandatory classification of teachers as permanent in joint union or union high school
districts (see note 3 supra) prior to 1963. These considerations were removed by the
repeal of the distinguishing codes sections in 1963.
The only qualification, therefore, to the general text statement is that its application
is not mandatory as to districts with less than 250 ADA.
30 Holbrook v. Board of Education, 37 Cal. 2d 316, 333, 231 P.2d 853, 863 (1951).
31 WmSTu's Tman NEw INTEnNATiONAL DICTiONARY 1806 (1961).
s2See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13101-86.
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destined to perform admirably or even adequately in educational posi-
tions. This is as true of teaching as of any other profession. More spe-
cifically, it is quite likely that not all such persons are destined to so
perform in a particular school district. Thus, it is fitting that persons
who aspire to the ranks of permanent teachers, with the tenure security
which such status affords, submit to a probationary period. On the
other hand, it is not inconceivable that a qualified-even a highly qual-
ified-person may be the victim of dismissal (including in the meaning
of this word, failure to be rehired) for reasons having no relationship
to his fitness as a teacher. The imagination may supply such potential
situations; a single illustration will suffice here: it is entirely possible
that a genuine personality conflict might exist between a probationary
teacher and his immediate supervisor, a conflict which could result
in a grossly inaccurate evaluation of the teacher and eventually lead
to dismissal, a situation which would result in a totally unnecessary
scar on the teacher's professional record. And yet both teacher and
supervisor might be qualified persons in all other respects. It is to
guard against such personal injustices, as well as to minimize the possi-
bility of permanent loss of qualified persons both to a particular district
and to our educational system as a whole, that the legislature has seen
fit to supply certain substantive and procedural restrictions on local
governing boards' power to dismiss probationary teachers.
Dismissal of Probationary Teachers "During the School Year"
Prior to 1961, the Education Code clearly differentiated between
two kinds of "dismissals" of probationary teachers. 3 Section 13442
provided (and still provides, the wording not having been changed by
recent amendments) that probationary employees dismissed during
the school year should be dismissed "for cause only, as in the case of
permanent employees."3 4 The school year begins on the first day of
July and ends on the last day of June," a full twelve-month period.
Thus since teachers are first "elected" for "the next ensuing school
year," and subsequently "re-elected from year to year,"36 it would
seem obvious that dismissal by any means other than failure to "re-
33 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13442, 13443-44 before the 1961 and 1963 amendments.
Compare Tucker v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 111 Cal. App. 2d 875, 245 P.2d
597 (1952), with Comstock v. Board of Trustees, 20 Cal. App. 2d 731, 67 P.2d 694
(1937); see also Titus v. Lawndale School Dist., 157 Cal. App. 2d 822, 322 P.2d 56
(1958) (dictum).
34 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13442: "Governing boards of school districts shall dismiss
probationary employees during the school year for cause only, as in the case of perma-
nent employees."
35 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 5101.
36 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13258.
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elect" was dismissal during the school year. In other words, if a school
district sought to terminate a probationary teacher's contract while it
was still running, this was an attempt to dismiss him during the school
year within the meaning of section 13442.
37
Thus it may be seen that a probationary teacher had certain statu-
tory rights flowing from his position as a teacher, which rights were
in excess of those under a simple contract of employment for a tern
certain. The statute did not make the precise nature of these rights as
clear, perhaps, as might be desired. First, did the requirement of
"cause" for dismissal mean that probationary employees were to be
dismissed only for those causes enumerated in section 13403 of the
Education Code,38 a section applicable in terms only to permanent
employees? Because of section 13442's final words, "as in the case of
permanent employees," the statute lends itself to such a construction.
Second, did these same final words indicate a legislative intent that
the procedure-as distinguished from the cause-for dismissing proba-
37 In Kimberlin v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 115 Cal. App. 2d 459, 252
P.2d 344 (1953), petitioner, a probationary teacher, was first notified of filing of charges
against him by a letter which stated that it was the intention of the governing board
"to dismiss you upon the 16th day of June, 1950 .... " Technically, this would have
been dismissal during the school year since the teacher had been "re-elected" for an
ensuing school year which did not end until June 30, 1950. But in its notice of dis-
missal, the board informed petitioner that he was dismissed "effective at the close of
business June 30, 1950, and that your services will not be required for the ensuing
year." Presumably, therefore, petitioner enjoyed his rights under the contract until
June 30, so that in fact he was not dismissed during the school year. Even had the
board not corrected the date in its notice of dismissal, it has been held in a case where
the date specified in the notice coincided with the date on which the teacher's duties
ended (June 5), that such notice was of intent not to rehire and not of intent to dismiss
during the school year. Salmon v. Allen, 1 Cal. App. 2d 115, 36 P.2d 153 (1934). It
would seem, however, that the board owes to itself and to the teacher the duty of
knowing the code definition of the school year. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 5101. Errors of
this nature breed litigation.
38 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13403:
No permanent employee shall be dismissed except for one or more of the fol-
lowing causes: (a) Immoral or unprofessional conduct. (b) Commission, aid-
ing or advocating the commission of acts of criminal syndicalism, as prohibited
by Chapter 188, Statutes of 1919, or in any amendment thereof. (c) Dis-
honesty. (d) Incompetency. (e) Evident unfitness for service. (f) Physical
or mental condition unfitting him to instruct or associate with children. (g)
Persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school laws of the State or reason-
able regulations prescribed for the government of the public schools by the
State Board of Education or by the governing board of the school district em-
ploying him. (h) Conviction of a felony or of any crime involving moral tur-
pitude. (i) Violation of Section 8455 of this code or conduct specified in
Section 1028 of the Government Code, added by Chapter 1418 of the Statutes
of 1947. (j) Violation of any provision in Section 12952 to 12958, inclusive,
of this code. (k) Knowing membership by the employee in the Communist
Party.
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tionary teachers during the school year also be that which had to be
followed in the case of dismissal of a permanent employee?
As for the first of these questions, a 1927 case construing the Polit-
ical Code predecessors of Education Code sections 13403 and 13442
indicated that the grounds for dismissing a probationary teacher during
the school year could be only those enumerated for the dismissal of
a permanent employee.89 On the other hand, a more recent case
40
construing the term dismissal for cause in a related Education Code
provision, the predecessor of pre-1961 section 13444, suggests that dis-
missal of a probationary teacher for cause requires "much less cause"
than the section specifying grounds for dismissal of permanent teachers.
"For example," noted the court, "the failure to conform with a reason-
able standard of excellence during the probationary period may con-
stitute a sufficient cause for terminating the employment."41 The latter
statement, however, was made with respect to dismissal by failure to
rehire upon the expiration of a probationary teacher's current contract
year, a second type of "dismissal," distinguished and discussed in
greater detail below. Quite possibly, both courts were correct. The
historically separate treatment that the legislature has accorded dis-
missal of a probationary teacher during the school year, as opposed
to mere failure to rehire, may well indicate an intent to require more
weighty grounds for this more drastic action.42 Furthermore, such
grounds as "failure to conform with a reasonable standard of excel-
lence" may well be perfectly adequate cause for failure to rehire since
presumably the administration's authority to enforce such value judg-
ments is the underlying reason for the teacher's probationary status.
39 Alexander v. Manton Union School Dist., 82 Cal. App. 330, 255 Pac. 516 (1927)
(dictum, for petitioner was a principal, and principals, whether permanent or probation-
ary employees, were expressly extended the rights of permanent employees by the statute
in force at that time), cited in Comstock v. Board of Trustees, 20 Cal. App. 2d 731, 67
P.2d 694 (1937). Moreover the cases subsequent to Alexander also cited by the court
in Comstockc as authority for this "rule" were not in point.
4 0 Keenan v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 34 Cal. 2d 708, 214 P.2d 382
(1950) (dictum).
41 Id. at 714, 214 P.2d at 385.
42 An attempt to dismiss any certified employee during the school year is an effort
at unilateral termination of a contract and would presumably be undertaken only for
very serious reasons, particularly during the months when pupils were actually in attend-
ance. The district would be faced with two unpleasant alternatives: (1) finding a re-
placement after virtually all of the state's non-substitutes were already under contract,
or (2) doubling up children in already overcrowded classrooms. Moreover, from the
teacher's point of view this action would be much more serious, as it would attach a
greater degree of reprehensibility to the teacher's conduct than would mere failure to
rehire, and it would virtually eliminate any possibility of finding employment as a
teacher, certainly for the balance of that school year.
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However, it must be conceded that this question appears not to have
been authoritatively decided.
The second question posed above, whether the final words of
section 13442, "as in the case of permanent employees," meant that
the legislature intended the procedure for dismissing probationary
teachers during the school year to be that prescribed for dismissal of
a permanent teacher, can be somewhat more authoritatively answered.
A 1937 case 3 construing the old School Code predecessor of Education
Code section 13442 ordered reinstatement of, and back salary paid to,
a probationary junior college teacher whom the local governing board
had sought to dismiss during the school year by merely notifying him
of its resolution to that effect, the court holding that the procedure
prescribed for dismissing permanent teachers had to be followed. Un-
fortunately, however, the court here relied on the 1927 case noted
above in connection with grounds for dismissal of probationary teachers
during the school year; in that earlier case the court's statement on the
issue of procedure for such dismissal was, again, obiter.44
To summarize the school year dismissal situation prior to 1961: (1)
"cause" for dismissal was necessary, and some authority 45 exists to the
effect that cause meant only those grounds for which a permanent
teacher could be dismissed under what is now Education Code section
13403; (2) the necessity for cause for dismissal presupposes a proce-
dure to establish this cause,46 and there is authority to the effect that
such procedure is that to be followed in the case of dismissal of a per-
manent teacher, 47 although, once more, this authority is somewhat
questionable in view of the cases therein relied upon.48 It is this
43 Comstock v. Board of Trustees, 20 Cal. App. 2d 731, 67 P.2d 694 (1937).
44See note 39 supra. Nor were other cases cited by the court in Comstock as sup-
porting Alexander in point as to this issue.
45 Comstock v. Board of Trustees, 20 Cal. App. 2d 731, 67 P.2d 694 (1937) (dic-
turn); Alexander v. Manton Joint Union School Dist., 82 Cal. App. 330, 255 Pac. 516
(1927) (dictum).
46 Tucker v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 111 Cal. App. 2d 875, 245 P.2d
597 (1952).
47 Comstock v. Board of Trustees, 20 Cal. App. 2d 731, 67 P.2d 694 (1937); Alex-
ander v. Manton Joint Union School Dist., 82 Cal. App. 330, 255 Pac. 516 (1927) (dic-
turn). An outline of the procedure that must be followed in the case of permanent
teachers follows in the text.
48 Comstock v. Board of Trustees, 20 Cal. App. 2d 731, 732, 67 P.2d 694
(1937). A possible third alternative is an argument that section 13442 should be read as
meaning that governing boards may dismiss probationary teachers during the school
year for some cause, just as permanent teachers may be dismissed only for cause, but
not as intending that either grounds or procedure must be that prescribed for permanent
teachers. But such a construction would render the final clause of section 14442 tauto-
logical, and it must be assumed that the legislature intended the words to convey some
additional meaning.
Feb., 1964]
writer's considered opinion that, as to both these issues, such authority
as exists has been headed in the right direction. The seriousness of a
school year dismissal, particularly during that period when pupils are
in attendance, has already been alluded to.49 It follows from this fact
that such a dismissal should not be predicated upon light and transient
grounds, nor should it be processed by means of a makeshift procedure.
While it is doubtless true, as one court has pointed out,50 that cause
for dismissal by failure to rehire may well be "failure to conform with
a reasonable standard of excellence during the probationary period,"
it would seem clear that the policy underlying the existence of the
probationary period would require that school officials seek to point
out, and assist the probationary teacher in attaining, this standard of
excellence during the school year, at least, for it is obvious that a pro-
bationary teacher is himself something of a student during the proba-
tionary years.
A further reason for this writer's opinion that section 13442 de-
mands both permanent teacher grounds and permanent teacher pro-
cedure for school year dismissal of probationary teachers is the effect
of the recent amendments upon section 13442. This particular effect
will be detailed below in the discussion of the general effect of these
amendments upon the entire dismissal situation. Basic to the writer's
position is his opinion that no change in the state of the law regarding
section 13442 was intended by the legislature and that none was
wrought by the amendments. 51 It is for this reason that the pre-1961
law regarding dismissal of probationary teachers during the school year
has been given detailed treatment above.
Assuming then that it has been and continues to be the intent of
the legislature to extend to probationary teachers dismissed during the
school year those substantive and procedural rights which accrue to
permanent teachers upon dismissal at any time, it would seem appro-
priate to review such rights here. This review must be brief for the
49 See note 42 supra.
50 Keenan v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 34 Cal. 2d 708, 214 P.2d 382
(1950).
51 This analysis is, as to procedure for dismissal during the school year, in accord
with an Attorney General's Opinion, wherein the answer to the question, "what proce-
dure should be followed if a probationary teacher is dismissed prior to the termination
of the school year," was that "a probationary teacher dismissed during the school year
is entitled to demand the same superior court hearing to which tenured [permanent]
teachers are entitled." 39 Ops. CAL. AT'Y GN. 186 (1962). It will be noticed that
this opinion was delivered subsequent to the 1961 amendments but prior to the 1963
session which added § 13445.1 to the Education Code, of which more infra. See also
Homer v. Board of Trustees, 61 A.C. - , 37 Cal. Rptr. 185, - P.2d - (March,
1964)
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reason that a full and adequate discussion of the rights of permanent
teachers in a dismissal situation is not possible within the scope of
this paper. 2
Grounds for Dismissal of Permanent Teachers
Education Code section 13403 specifies in its subsections the
grounds for dismissal of permanent employees. 53 It is important to
note that this list is exclusive; cause for dismissal must be fitted into
one or more of the grounds enumerated, a fact which is made clear
by the introductory words of the statute: "No permanent employee
shall be dismissed except for one or more of the following causes .... "
No cases are to be found wherein the contrary has been contended. As'
a practical matter, however, it may readily be seen that some of the
specified grounds (for example, "immoral or unprofessional conduct,"
"dishonesty," "incompetency") are framed in quite general language
and are thus subject to all the virtues and vices peculiar thereto.' 4 This
fact is the source of much of the appellate litigation arising from section
13403. It would serve no useful purpose to attempt a review of ex-
amples of successful and unsuccessful charges under the more general
of the specified grounds. Such issues ultimately are questions of fact
and here, as elsewhere, appellate courts are reluctant to disturb the
findings of the court of first instance. 55 However, the statement that
cause for dismissal must lie within one or more of the grounds enu-
merated in section 13403 bears repeating.
Procedural Rights of Permanent Teachers
In the area of a permanent teacher's procedural rights in a dismissal
situation it is both possible and desirable to be more definitive. The
legislature having extended to teachers certain substantive rights with
respect to his employment, it is only natural that it should protect these
52 See generally, 44 CAL. Jun. 2d Schools §§ 507-18 (1958). Research has failed
to disclose any discussion of this subject in California more recent than a Comment, 24
CAIm. L. REv. 441 (1936), the usefulness of which is now rather limited; and because
teacher tenure laws differ widely in scope and wording recourse to non-California mate-
rials appears to be of little value. The statutes, however, are not complex, and research
into the applicable Education Code sections in the annotated codes would seem to be
the best means of attaining a detailed understanding of this subject. These sections are
cited as they are discussed in the text infra.
53 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13403. This section is set out in its entirety in note 38 supra.
54 See Note, License Revocation: Uncertainty and Due Process, 15 HAsI-nGS L.J.
- (1964) (infra this issue).
55 Board of Education v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 556, 261 P.2d 261, 268 (1953).
Notes of decisions in the annotated codes and annotations in the encyclopedias provide
a representative sample of such instances. See, e.g., 44 CaL. JuR. 2d Schools § 509
(1958).
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rights through procedural safeguards. The safeguards are to be found
in Education Code sections 13404 through 13441.
The procedure begins with the filing with the governing board of
a formal written statement of charges against the teacher. This state-
ment is usually executed by the district superintendent, but the gov-
erning board itself may formulate the charges. After the statement is
filed the board may, by majority vote, resolve to notify the teacher "of
its intention to dismiss him at the expiration of thirty days from the
date of service of the notice, unless the employee demands a hearing
. "...-56 If the board does resolve to notify the teacher of its intention
to dismiss, such notice must be in writing and served upon the teacher
personally or by mailing it to his last known address, attaching thereto
a copy of the charges and copies of certain Education Code sections
dealing with his tenure rights.57 Although section 13404, providing for
the filing of a statement of charges, does not specify the detail with
which such charges must be set forth, the charges should be formulated
at this point with the degree of particularity necessary to inform the
teacher of their nature so that he may properly prepare a defense. The
courts rightfully assume the necessity of this in cases where the charges
come on for judicial hearing.58 In such cases, the charges will form
the foundation for the complaint and for this further reason should be
drafted with an eye to that possibility and the realization that such a
complaint is demurrable.59 If the teacher does not demand a hearing
within thirty days, as is his right under section 13404, he is considered
to have waived this right and may be dismissed upon the expiration
of the thirty-day period.60 If the teacher demands a hearing, however,
the board has two options, either (a) to rescind its intention to dismiss,
or
(b) to file a complaint in the superior court of the county in which
the school district. .. is located, setting forth the charges against the
employee and asking that the court inquire into the charges and deter-
mine whether or not the charges are true, and if true, whether or not
they constitute sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the employee,
under the provisions of this code, and for judgment pursuant to its
findings.61
56 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13404. See also a form for the statement of charges follow-
ing § 13404 in Deering's Annotated Education Code.
57 CAL. EDuc. CODE §13405. See also a form for the notice of intention to dismiss
following § 13405 in Deering's Annotated Education Code.
58 See, e.g., Laguna Beach Unified School Dist. v. Lewis, 146 Cal. App. 24 463,
304 P.2d 59 (1956).
59 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13414.
60 CAL. Enuc. CODE § 13406.
61 CAL. EDuc. CODE §13412. See also a form for the complaint for dismissal fol-
lowing § 13412 in Deering's Annotated Education Code.
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This provision is an excellent indication of the seriousness with
which the legislature regards dismissal of a permanent teacher (and
presumably of a probationary teacher during the school year): the
first hearing on the merits of the dismissal is not administrative but
judicial.
02
Upon service of summons accompanied by a copy of the complaint,
the teacher must demur or answer within ten days. Failure to demur
or to plead results in entry of default, and thereupon "judgment shall
be entered by the court declaring the right of the governing board to
dismiss the employee."6 3 Demurrer may be upon any of the grounds
specified in the Code of Civil Procedure and procedure on the demurrer
is that followed in a civil action.64 If an answer is filed, the governing
board may demur thereto, with the same effect as in a civil action.6
A proceeding of this nature must be set for trial at the earliest
possible date and must be given precedence over all other cases, except
older matters of the same nature and other actions to which special
precedence is given by law. 66 A novel provision respecting these pro-
ceedings is that, upon motion of either party, in the court's discretion, or
upon its own motion, the court "may appoint three disinterested persons
over 21 years of age as referees, to ascertain the facts and report their
findings to the court."(1 Whether the case is heard at trial or hearing
by referees, both parties may be represented by counsel.68 Some spe-
cial rules of evidence are applicable to these proceedings: in the case
of a hearing before referees, the code provides that technical rules of
evidence shall not apply;69 in either case, the code provides that "no
testimony shall be given or evidence introduced relating to matters
which occurred more than three years prior to the date of the filing
of the complaint."70 Records relating to the teacher which are regu-
larly kept by the governing board may be introduced into evidence,
62In Comment, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 441 (1936), the writer notes the pendency of
an initiative constitutional amendment proposing to establish an administrative tribunal,
called a "State Tenure Board," to try dismissal charges. Since this proposal is not part
of the constitution, we may assume that it was rejected by the electorate. Nor, pre-
sumably, did this proposal recommend itself to the legislature in view of the fact that
the judicial hearing has continued as part of the procedure for some twenty-eight years.6 3 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13414.
6 4 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13415. See CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. §§ 430, 444.
65 CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13414.
66 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13416.
67 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13418. Sections 13419-22, 13424, 13426-32 set forth special
provisions for such a hearing.
(8 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13425.
69 CAL. EDUc. CODE § 13426.
70 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13433.
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"but no dismissal of the employee, or judgment that the governing
board may dismiss him may be made on the records alone."71
Code sections intervening among those discussed herein deal gen-
erally with pre-hearing actions which the board may take in the event
of the filing of certain charges; for example, immediate suspension of
the teacher upon a charge of immoral conduct, conviction of felony,
or of any crime involving moral turpitude, or incompetency due to
mental disability, etc. 72 Finally, both parties are given the right to
appeal from the judgment of the superior court.7 3
The grounds and procedure for dismissal must be those outlined
above; a teacher whom the governing board is attempting to dismiss
in derogation of the rights extended to him by the statutes may obtain
an injunction to restrain the board from proceeding with its illegal ac-
tion, 74 and in the event such action has been consummated, it is well
established that the teacher may petition for a writ of mandate to
compel reinstatement and the payment of back salary7 5
"Dismissal" of Probationary Teachers by Failure to Rehire
As has been noted, the statutes as they existed on the eve of the
1961 amendments distinguished between two types of "dismissal' of
probationary teachers. Education Code section 13442, discussed at
length above, was applicable in terms to probationary teachers dis-
missed "during the school year."76 On the other hand, section 13443
clearly contemplated a different kind of "dismissal."77 Although this
71 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13434. Such records have been held admissible without this
special provision under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act (CAL. CODE CIv.
PRoc. §§ 1953e-h) as a statutory exception to the hearsay rule, so long as they were
not prepared after the charges were made. Fox v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
111 Cal. App. 2d 885, 245 P.2d 603 (1952). Thus the proviso in CAr. EDUC. CODE
§ 13434 that no dismissal or judgment that the board may dismiss shall be made on these
records alone would seem to be a stricter evidentiary requirement than that existing for
civil actions generally. Cf. Fox, 111 Cal. App. 2d at 891, 245 P.2d at 608.
72 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13408. See also §§ 13407 ("general" incompetency), § 13409
(teacher charged with a sex offense).
73 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13440.
74 Grigsby v. King, 202 Cal. 299, 260 Pac. 789 (1927).
75 Kennedy v. Board of Educ., 82 Cal. 483, 22 Pac. 1042 (1890); Titus v. Lawn-
dale School Dist., 157 Cal. App. 2d 822, 322 P.2d 56 (1958); Daughterty v. Board of
Trustees, 111 Cal. App. 2d 519, 244 P.2d 950 (1952).
76 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13442, quoted in note 34 supra.
77 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13443. The current wording of this section is here set forth;
that portion of the statute as it existed prior to 1961 is set in roman type, the material
added by Cal. Stat. 1961 ch. 2063 § 1, p. 4290, is italicized:
(a) On or before the 15th day of May in any year the governing board may
give notice in writing to a probationary employee that his services will not be
required for the ensuing year.
The notice shall be deemed sufficient and complete when delivered in
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section was, and remains, in the annotated codes entitled "Notice re-
quired for dismissal of probationary employee," use of the word "dis-
missal" is unfortunate.78 This title indicates at first glance that the
section is applicable to dismissal generally, but the first sentence clearly
shows that the section contemplates a decision by a governing board
not to rehire a probationary employee for an ensuing school year. In
fact, prior to 1961, the word "dismissal" did not even appear in the
body of this section. Moreover, in view of the fact that section 13442
had already prescribed the requirements for dismissal of a probationary
teacher during the school year, the only possible application of section
13443 would be to a decision not to offer the teacher a contract for the
next year; that is, a failure to rehire; there is no other alternative means
of terminating the teacher's employment relationship.
Turning to the substance of section 13443, it may readily be seen
that prior to 1961, a probationary teacher had no tenure, as this word
is commonly understood, in his position. He had the "right"-if it can
be called such-to be notified in writing prior to May 15 of his contract
year that his services would not be required for the ensuing year. How-
ever, this bare minimum of "right" did carry with it certain advantages
to the teacher. First, his rights and duties under his current contract
continued until the end of the current school year-that is, until June
3079-for, as we have seen, an attempt to terminate his contract pre-
maturely was dismissal during the school year, for which action "cause"
was necessary as well as the procedural safeguards surrounding the
dismissal of a permanent teacher. Moreover, the governing board was
person to the employee by the clerk or secretary of the governing board of the
school district or deposited in the United States registered mail with postage
prepaid, addressed to the employee at his last known address.
(b) Upon the request of such employee, the governing board shall give such
employee a written statement of the reasons for the dismissal. The determina-
tion of the board as to the sufficiency of the reasons for dismissal shall be con-
clusive but the cause shall relate solely to the welfare of the schools and the
pupils thereof. No right of judicial review shall exist for such employee on the
question of the sufficiency of the reasons for dismissal.
78 "Historically the courts and legislature have referred to termination of employ-
ment of a probationary employee, whether during the school year as well as at the end
of the school year, as a dismissal." 39 Ops. CAL. Av'r'Y GEN. 186, 190 (1962). But not-
withstanding this custom, the courts have not treated the two types of "dismissals" in
the same way. The somewhat misleading dictum suggesting the contrary in Griggs v.
Board of Trustees, 218 A.C.A. 24, 33, 32 Cal. Rptr. 355, 361 (1963) was corrected on
appeal in Griggs v. Board of Trustees, 61 A.C. -, 37 Cal. Rptr. 194, - P.2d
- (March 1964).
79 See CAL. EDUc. CODE § 5101.
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required to notify him of its decision in writing,80 and this notification
had to take place on or before May 15 of the current contract year.
Where such notice was not given, or not given by the date specified,
a probationary teacher was deemed rehired and could if necessary
by petition for mandamus obtain reinstatement.81
The "rights" under section 13443 of the Education Code and its
School Code predecessor were available generally; no exception was
made by the terms of this section for large or small districts or for dis-
tricts having certain geographical peculiarities.8 2 However, in 1935
the School Code predecessor of section 1344483 was amended to extend
additional rights to probationary teachers "dismissed" in school dis-
tricts having a certain minimum average daily attendance (ADA).
8 4
Although this section (then and now) speaks of "dismissal" generally,
it was again the intent of the legislature that the dismissal contem-
80 "Any language which may be reasonably understood to mean that his tenure as
a probationary teacher has been terminated is sufficient." Volandri v. Taylor, 124 Cal.
App. 356, 359, 12 P.2d 462, 463 (1932). Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 751 (1963) collects cases
on the sufficiency of notice of intention not to rehire.
81 This was true notwithstanding the fact that another teacher had meanwhile been
hired by the board to fill the "vacant" position. Thibaut v. Key, 126 Cal. App. 32, 14
P.2d 138 (1932).
82 See note 29 supra.
83 On the eve of the 1961 amendments, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13444 read as follows:
Anything in Section 13443 to the contrary notwithstanding, governing boards
of school districts having an average daily attendance of 85,000 or more pupils
shall dismiss probationary employees for cause only. The determination of the
board as to the sufficiency of the cause for dismissal shall be conclusive, but
the cause shall relate solely to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof.
In case a hearing is requested by the employee the proceeding shall be
conducted in accordance with Chapter 5 of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of
the Government Code and the governing board shall have all the power
granted to an agency in said Chapter 5, except that the respondent shall file his
notice of defense, if any, within five days after service upon him of accusation
and he shall be notified of such five-day period for filing in the accusation. All
expenses of the hearing, including the cost of the hearing officer, shall be paid
by the governing board from the district funds.
The board may adopt from time to time such rules and procedures not
inconsistent with provisions of this section, as may be necessary to effectuate
this section.
Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 2 § 1, pp. 595, 948.
The second and third paragraphs were originally added in 1953. Cal. Stat. 1953,
ch. 88 § 2, p. 810.
The present wording of § 13444 is given at note 102 infra.
84 A school district's "ADA" means, generally, the number of pupils in attendance
in all the district's schools on the average day during a given period. For example, if
on the average day ninety per cent of a district's pupils were in attendance, a school
district with a total enrollment in all schools of 95,000 would have an ADA of 85,500.
Actual determination of ADA is much more painstaking than simply taking a percentage
of total enrollment; in practice, ADA is determined quite accurately from the daily
attendance reports of every classroom teacher in the district. ADA will always be some
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plated be failure to rehire for the ensuing school year.85 Three reasons
warrant this conclusion: (1) as was pointed out at some length above,
section 13442, by the better view, has pre-empted the area of dismissal
during the school year; (2) section 13444 in its opening sentence re-
ferred to section 13443 in such a manner as to indicate an intent that
section 13444 be a particular quantitative qualification of the general
type of "dismissal" to which section 13443 is applicable; to wit,
dismissal by failure to rehire; (3) research fails to disclose any appel-
late cases wherein districts have attempted to dismiss a probationary
teacher during the school year by means of the procedure prescribed
in pre-1961 section 13444,80 a situation which is at least negatively
indicative of the interpretation placed upon the legislative intent by
interested persons in the field.
The additional rights granted by the 1935 amendments to section
13444 to probationary teachers in districts of 85,000 or more ADA were
primarily these: (1) failure to rehire a probationary teacher had to be
for cause; and (2) the necessity for cause implied a hearing so that the
existence or non-existence of cause could be ascertained. 87 Moreover,
the requirement of cause for dismissal was further qualified by the pro-
viso that cause should relate solely to the welfare of the schools and the
pupils. On the other hand, the statute expressly stated that the deter-
mination of the board as to the sufficiency of the cause should be
conclusive. Prior to 1953, there was no specific hearing procedure
prescribed by this section; thus, it was necessary for the superior court,
hearing a petition for mandate, to consider the procedure surrounding
the hearing, if such procedure were attacked, in order to determine
whether the procedure complied with reasonable due process stand-
ards.88 The additions to section 13444 by the 1953 amendments 9 ob-
figure less than total enrollment, depending upon the incidence of absences. See gen-
erally CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 11251-653.
Much emphasis is placed at all levels on accurate and punctual reporting of ADA
because, among other uses, a district's ADA determines the amount of state educational
aid to be allocated to the district.
85 See 39 CAL. Ops. Arr'y GEN. 186, 190 (1962).
86 Riggins v. Board of Educ., 144 Cal. App. 2d 232, 300 P.2d 848 (1956), is an
example of proceedings under this section held properly conducted, wherein "dismissal"
was by failure to rehire.
8 7 Keenan v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 34 Cal. 2d 708, 214 P.2d 382
(1950); Tucker v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 111 Cal. App. 2d 875, 245 P.2d
597 (1952).
88 Ibid. In Keenan, the court held that the procedure followed did not constitute
a hearing. In Tucker, involving the same governing board, the court held that the pro-
cedural rules and regulations promulgated by the board as a result of the Keenan deci-
sion did prescribe an adequate procedure.
8o Cal. Stat. 1953 ch. 1040 § 1, p. 2508. See note 83 supra.
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viated the necessity of a court's passing upon the adequacy of a local
board's do-it-yourself procedure; these amendments required that the
hearings be held pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Ad-
judication section of the Administrative Procedure Act.90
From these additional rights granted three decades ago to proba-
tionary teachers in the larger districts arose some very important
judicial implications; furthermore, as will be seen from the later dis-
cussion of the effects of the 1961 and 1963 amendments, the importance
of these implications is no longer confined to the larger districts.
Under the provisions of section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
it is accepted that the writ of mandate is the proper remedy for testing
the claim that a teacher has been wrongfully ousted from his position. 91
With what questions might the court, under section 13444, be con-
cerned? In two district court of appeal, cases, the first 92 prior to the
1961 amendments and the second9" after these amendments, two dif-
ferent district courts held that the role of the court is to determine
whether, under section 1094.5(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, there
is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings and the
conclusion of the board "that the cause conclusively found to exist
relates solely to the welfare of the school and the pupils thereoL "94
In other words, the court in both cases stated that it would look at the
record only to determine (1) whether substantial evidence existed
therein to support the board's findings, and (2) to ascertain that the
board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that its findings sup-
ported a cause for dismissal which related solely to the welfare of the
schools and pupils. The first of these is an accepted power of a court
in reviewing the action of an administrative tribunal; the second is a
requirement upon the court imposed by this particular statute to insure
that the court does not substitute its judgment as to what constitutes
sufficient cause (grounds) for dismissal for that of the board. The only
standard against which the board's discretion as to cause is to be tested
is whether or not the findings supported the board's conclusion that
the grounds for dism-issal related solely to the welfare of the schools
and pupils. This construction would seem to be a recognition of the
Supreme Court's dictum in Keenan v. San Francisco Unified School
90 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 11500-28.
91 See note 75 supra.
92 Riggins v. Board of Educ., 144 Cal. App. 2d 232, 300 P.2d 848 (1956).
93 Griggs v. Board of Trustees, 218 A.C.A. 24, 32 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1963), aff'd 61
A.C. -, 37-Cal. Rptr. 194, - P.2d - (March 1964).
94 Id. at 37, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (relying almost verbatim upon Riggins, supra
note 92).
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District5 that "cause" in section 13444 meant "much less cause than
that justifying charges against a permanent teacher." The courts in the
two cases noted above, however, successfully attempt to state just how
much less this cause need be, under section 13444.
To summarize the position of the probationary teacher, prior to
1961, with respect to dismissal by failure to rehire: (1) a teacher in
a district with less than 85,000 ADA had the "right" to written notifica-
tion of intent not to rehire, delivered prior to May 15; (2) a teacher in
a district with an ADA of 85,000 or more had, in addition to the above
rights, the right (a) to be refused re-employment only for a cause
related solely to the welfare of the schools and the pupils; and (b) to
a hearing to determine this cause; and (c) after 1953, to a hearing
conducted under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
In both cases, a teacher could test the legality of his dismissal through
petition for a writ of mandate.
Effect of the 1961 Amendments on "Dismissal" by Failure to Rehire
We come now to a consideration of legislation which amounts to a
revolution in the area of substantive and procedural rights of the vast
majority of the state's probationary teachers. In 1961, the legislature
amended sections 13443 and 13444 of the Education Code. Section
13443 was amended by the addition of a new paragraph.9 6 It will be
remembered that originally this section permitted the local governing
board to dismiss a probationary employee by failure to rehire simply
by written notification prior to May 15 that his services would not be
required for the ensuing year. After 1961, the right to written notifica-
tion prior to May 15 remains, but the teacher is given additional rights
by the added paragraph: (1) he may request a written statement of
reasons for the dismissal;9 7 (2) the reasons (grounds) must constitute
a cause; (3) this cause must relate solely to the welfare of the schools
and the pupils thereof; and (4) by implication, upon the authority of
Keenan,"8 some sort of hearing on the cause would be necessary. (But
see the discussion of amended section 13444, below.) Again we find
the qualification that the sufficiency of the reasons shall be the conclu-
sive determination of the board; in fact, the section now specifically
05 34 Cal. 2d 708, 214 P.2d 382 (1950) (dictum, in that denial of writ of mandate
by the trial court was reversed on grounds that the hearing contemplated by the statute
was not accorded petitioner). The dictum is cited with approval in 39 CAL. O.'s. Arr'y
GrN. 186, 189 (1962). The decision in Keenan is well-considered; it assigned a reason-
able application to what might otherwise have been a meaningless statute.
06 See the italicized paragraph of section 13443 as quoted at note 77 supra.
97 See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 1018 (1963), as to the sufficiency of the language used
by a teacher to indicate a request for a hearing.
98 34 Cal. 2d 708, 214 P.2d 382 (1950).
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states that no right of judicial review shall exist on the question of the
sufficiency of the reasons for dismissal. It will be noted that the word-
ing of this added paragraph bears a close resemblance to the wording
of the first paragraph of pre-1961 section 13444,99 which then applied
only to probationary teachers in the 85,000 or more ADA districts.
However, there are some differences. The most important of these
differences, at least superficially, is that while pre-1961 section 13444
stated that "the determination of the board as to the sufficiency of the
cause for dismissal shall be conclusive," amended section 13443 says
that "the determination of the board as to the sufficiency of the reasons
for dismissal shall be conclusive." (Emphases added.) Does this literal
difference necessitate any substantial distinction between the courts'
construction of pre-1961 section 13444 and the current section 13443?
It is submitted that it does not. It will be remembered that the district
court of appeal in Riggins v. Board of Education,100 construing section
13444 in 1956, decided that the court's job was to determine (1)
whether there existed substantial evidence to support the board's find-
ings, and (2) to determine whether there was any abuse of discretion
in the board's determination that the cause for dismissal related solely
to the welfare of the schools and pupils thereof. Although section
13443 as amended specifically disallows judicial review on the question
of the sufficiency of the reasons for dismissal, it does not say that there
shall be no review as to the question of whether the reasons given by
the board do in fact relate solely to the welfare of the schools and the
pupils. Indeed, it would be a very strange statute which provided
that cause for dismissal should relate solely to the welfare of the schools
and pupils (as this one does), but which then was construed to mean
that the conclusion of the board as to whether the cause did relate to
such welfare was conclusive upon a reviewing court (note that the
statute does not say the latter). Thus, the only reasonable conclusion
is that with respect to cause (or "grounds," or "reasons") for dismissal
by failure to rehire, the court's job in hearing a petition for mandate
is that which was enunciated in Riggins. Such was the conclusion of
the district court in 1963 in Griggs v. Board of Trustees'0' and is clearly
the proper one.
Turning now to the amendment of section 13444,102 we find that
some of the questions raised by section 13443 are answered and also
09 See note 83 supra.
100 144 Cal. App. 2d 232, 300 P.2d 848 (1956).
101218 A.C.A. 24, 32 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1963), aff'd 61 A.C. - , 37 Cal. Rptr.
194, - P.2d - (March 1964).
102 CAL. Enuc. CoDE § 13444:
The governing board of any school district shall dismiss probationary em-
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that the conclusions arrived at above in the discussion of section 13443
are reinforced. First, the provisions of section 13444 now apply, with
one important exception, to probationary employees generally; that is,
this section is no longer limited in its application to those probationary
employees in schools districts of 85,000 or more ADA. Lest there be
any doubt as to the substantive rights given by section 13443, the
first sentence of section 13444 states that "the governing board of any
school district shall dismiss probationary employees for cause only."
(Emphasis added.) The section then discusses cause in these words:
The determination of the board as to the sufficiency of the cause for
dismissal shall be conclusive, but the cause shall relate solely to the
welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof. The determination of
the board as to the sufficiency of the cause for dismissal shall not be
subject to judicial review. The causes for dismissal shall not be re-
stricted to those specified in Section 13403.
It should be noted that this language is a return to that of the pre-1961
section and appears to add force to the conclusion reached above that,
with respect to cause ("grounds" or "reasons"), a reviewing court may
determine only whether a board abused its discretion in concluding
that the cause related solely to the welfare of the schools and pupils,
the test established by Riggins and followed in Griggs. Moreover, in
proscribing any restriction of causes for dismissal to those enumerated
ployees for cause only. The determination of the board as to the sufficiency of
the cause for dismissal shall be conclusive, but the cause shall relate solely to
the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof. The determination of the
board as to the sufficiency of the cause for dismissal shall not be subject to
judicial review. The causes for dismissal shall not be restricted to those speci-
fied in Section 13403.
No employee shall be denied the right to a hearing to determine the cause
for his dismissal and in case a hearing is requested by the employee the pro-
ceeding shall be conducted in accordance with Chapter 5 of Part 1 of Division
3 of Title 2 of the Government Code and the governing board shall have all
the power granted to an agency in said Chapter 5, except that the respondent
shall file his notice of defense, if any, within five days after service upon him
of accusation and he shall be notified of such five-day period for filing in the
accusation, and excepting further, that in districts with an average daily attend-
ance of less than 85,000 the governing board of the district itself may conduct
the hearing without its being presided over by a hearing officer as otherwise
required by Chapter 5. No employee in districts with an average daily attend-
ance of less than 85,000 shall be denied the right to receive written notice
stating the causes for dismissal and such written notice shall not deprive any
employee so dismissed of the further right to a hearing as described in this
section. All expenses of the hearing, including the cost of the hearing officer,
shall be paid by the governing board from the district funds.
The board may adopt from time to time such rules and procedures not
inconsistent with provisions of this section, as may be necessary to effectuate
this section.
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in section 13403 (applicable to permanent teachers),1°8 the legislature
gives an insight into its meaning of the term "sufficiency of the cause":
the reviewing court is not to use the grounds enumerated in section
13403 as a standard for determining whether the board abused its dis-
cretion in concluding that the reasons for dismissal related solely to the
welfare of the schools and pupils thereof; rather, this latter require-
ment is to be measured entirely independently of any pre-existing
standard.104
In March, 1964, only a few weeks prior to this writing, the supreme
court, upon hearing petitioner's appeal from the appellate court's de-
cision in Griggs, used the following significant language in affirming:
Nothing in the language of section 13444 prevents the reviewing
court from determining whether the board has proceeded in excess
of jurisdiction, whether there has been a fair trial, and whether the
board's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. How-
ever, where there is evidence to support the board's findings of fact
and where the cause for dismissal found by the board can reasonably
be said to relate to the "welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof;'
the reviewing court may not consider whether the facts found are suf-
ficiently serious to justify dismissal.
[Certain findings of the board as to petitioner's conduct are] clearly
a matter which relates to the welfare of the school and its pupils, and,
as we have seen, where the cause for dismissal can reasonably be said
to relate to the welfare of the school and its pupils, it is solely for the
board to determine whether dismissal is warranted. Accordingly, the
trial court could not properly substitute its own judgment for that of
the board on the question of the sufliciency of the cause for Mrs.
Griggs' dismissal.105
This decision would clearly seem to support the analysis set forth
above.
In addition to extending to the probationary teacher the substan-
tive right to cause for dismissal by failure to rehire, post-1961 section
13444 also prescribes procedural safeguards for the ascertainment of
cause. Doubtless having in mind the procedural problems raised by
section 13444 in Keenan,10 when the section applied only to proba-
tionary teachers in the larger school districts, and before the 1953
amendments providing for hearing pursuant to the terms of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,'0 7 the legislature provided in terms that
103 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13403 (quoted in note 38 supra).
104 Thus the legislature recognizes in terms the dictum in Keenan, 34 Cal. 2d 708,
714, 214 P.2d 382, 385 (1950).
105 Griggs v. Board of Educ., 61 AC--, 37 Cal. Rptr. 194, - P.2d - (March
1964) (emphasis added).
106 34 Cal. 2d 708, 214 P.2d 382 (1950).
107 See notes 83 and 102 supra.
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no teacher should be denied the right to a hearing to determine cause
for his dismissal, and further, if he requested a hearing, that it should
be conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act,
with the local board having the power given by the Act to an agency.
There is no requirement that the hearing itself be conducted prior to
May 15; it must, however, be held within a reasonable time after de-
mand therefor.
10 8
At this point section 13444 continues to maintain one distinction
between the very large school districts and all others: in districts hav-
ing an ADA of less than 85,000 the governing board may conduct the
hearing without its being presided over by a hearing officer as is other-
wise provided by the Act. Note the use of the permissive word "may";
the governing board of a district of less than 85,000 ADA is not re-
quired to conduct the hearing with a hearing officer, but it may do
so.108a
Before leaving the discussion of the specific provisions of the recent
amendments, two additions to the Education Code should be noted.
Besides the 1961 amendments to sections 13443 and 13444, section
13443.5 was added, also in 1961.109 Briefly, this section provides for
the forwarding by a local governing board which has dismissed a
teacher by failure to rehire of a copy of the statement of cause or
reasons for dismissal to the State Department of Education for descrip-
tive and statistical analysis purposes; this analysis then forms the basis
for an annual report to the legislature as to causes or reasons for dis-
missal. The new section is of particular interest here because it clearly
distinguishes between dismissal pursuant to section 13442110 (dismissal
during the school year) on the one hand, and failure to rehire pursuant
to section 13443 on the other, thus indicating a legislative conviction
that these are two distinctive types of dismissals. Moreover, appar-
ently for the purpose of emphasizing that dismissal of probationary
teachers during the school year should be for the causes, and by means
1o Homer v. Board of Trustees, 61 A.C. - , 37 Cal. Rptr. 185, - P.2d
(March 1964); Sitzman v. City Board of Educ., 61 A.C. - , 37 Cal. Rptr. 191, -
P.2d - (March 1964). The notice itself, pursuant to § 13443, is the dismissal; when
such notice is given prior to May 15, the teacher is dismissed "subject to the condition
subsequent" of the dismissal being reversed at the hearing and the teacher being rein-
stated. Thus, the fact that the hearing is not held prior to May 15 does not mean that
the teacher has been re-elected for another year, if the court affirms the dismissal. Horner,
supra.
rosa In 1961-62 there were three districts in the state with an ADA in excess of
85,000: Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco. Letter from Mr. Garford G. Gor-
don, supra note 15a. Mr. Gordon adds that it is his understanding that Long Beach is
now also in this category.
109 Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 2063 § 2, p. 4290.
110 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13442 (quoted in note 34 supra).
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of the procedure, prescribed by the Education Code section relating
to dismissal of permanent teachers, and not pursuant to sections 13443
and 13444, the legislature added in 1963 section 13444.5,111 which re-
cites that "The provisions of Sections 13443 and 13444 shall not be con-
strued as in any way modifying or affecting the provisions of Section
13442."
A further fact that should be noted is that the amendments are
applicable to teachers who were employed in the system at their effec-
tive date and not merely to those teachers hired thereafter."1
2
Summary of the Current Probationary Teacher Dismissal Situation
The net result of the recent amendments has been to extend to the
probationary teacher the right of notice, cause, and a hearing, if re-
quested, when a local governing board decides not to rehire him for
the next school year. The only distinction that now exists between
dismissal by failure to rehire in districts of 85,000 or more ADA and
all other districts is that the larger districts must employ a hearing
officer from the Office of Administrative Procedure of the Department
of General Services to conduct the hearing; other districts are not re-
quired to but may employ a hearing officer. Meanwhile, school year
dismissal of a probationary teacher must continue to be that prescribed
for permanent teachers, as to both cause and procedure.
Caveats and Suggestions for Teachers and Local Governing Boards
Many school districts throughout the state found themselves in a
dilemma in 1962 at the time they determined not to rehire certain pro-
bationary teachers. Pursuant to advice of counsel, they notified the
teachers of their intention not to rehire. Many of the teachers de-
manded to know why, as is now their right under section 13443. Some
requested a hearing under section 13444. At this point, superintendents
consulted counsel, who from sketchy and sometimes completely inade-
quate information prepared accusations, as is required under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act." 3 Since it was not necessary before the
amendments, school administrators had never documented the reasons
for their belief that the probationary teacher should not be rehired. It
should be noted, also, that school administrators used teacher evalua-
tion forms (which are very general) primarily for improving the par-
ticular teacher and not for recording and documenting his faults and
failures. As a result, the accusations were almost universally deficient
111 Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 59 § 1, p. 687.
1
12 Sitzman v. City Board of Educ., 61 A.C. - , 37 Cal. Rptr. 191, - P.2d
- (March 1964).
"13 CaL. Gov. CODE § 11503.
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as proper pleadings under Government Code section 11503. Most were
conclusionary. Some typical allegations were these: (1) teacher has
failed to provide pupils with courses of study required by law; (2)
teacher lacks the necessary potential to be a classroom teacher; (3)
teacher shows lack of proper organization of work; (4) teacher was
insubordinate. Without more, such allegations are clearly insufficient
in law. "The accusation shall be a written statement of charges which
shall set forth in ordinary and concise language the acts or omissions
with which the respondent is charged, to the end that the respondent
will be able to prepare his defense.""', Clearly the quoted examples
are too uncertain and indefinite for the teacher to be able to identify
any particular transaction as cause for the administration's failure to
rehire him, and consequently they are not charges to which the teacher
could prepare an adequate defense.
Surprisingly, attorneys representing teachers have failed to make
pre-hearing objections to the form of the accusation under sections
11506(2) and (3) of the Government Code 1 5 with the result that
hearing officers have found it difficult to rule on objections during the
hearing and to keep irrelevant and immaterial evidence out of the
record. This has unduly obscured the material issues and prolonged
some hearings. Attorneys representing teachers would be well advised
to raise the appropriate objections to such pleadings, not only to better
prepare themselves for the hearing, but also to eliminate nebulous
parts of the allegations.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act 16 the governing board
may hear the case with a hearing officer presiding, ruling on the admis-
sion of evidence and advising the board on matters of law. Alterna-
tively, the board may assign the matter to the hearing officer sitting
alone. When the hearing officer sits with the board, he will attend the
executive session with the board following the hearing, at the time
it makes its decision. The hearing officer will not advise the board as
to how it should decide the case, but he will inform it of the applicable
law. His responsibility is to prevent the board from committing re-
114 Ibid.
115 CAL. GOV. CODE § 11506:
(a) Within 15 days after service upon him of the accusation the respond-
ent may file with the agency a notice of defense in which he may:
(1) Request a hearing;
(2) Object to the accusation upon the ground that it does not state acts
or omissions upon which the agency may proceed;
(3) Object to the form of the accusation on the ground that it is so indef-
inite or uncertain that he cannot identify the transaction or prepare his de-
fense ....
116 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11512 is the specific section governing the conduct of hearing.
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versible error. He will prepare the written decision in accordance with
the board's findings of fact and determination of the issues. When the
hearing officer sits alone, he prepares a written proposed decision. The
board may adopt or refuse to adopt the proposed decision of the hear-
ing officer. In the latter event it can decide the case itself upon the
record, including the transcript, after affording the teacher an oppor-
tunity to present oral or written argument.1 1
7
Although districts of less than 85,000 ADA are not required to use
a hearing officer, they are strongly urged to do so. The technical
knowledge and experience to conduct such hearings, requiring special
training and experience, are generally not found in members of local
governing boards. Failure to employ a hearing officer exposes the
board to the risk of unduly lengthy hearings, probable reversible error,
and possible injustice.
Governing board members or their counsel should first consult with
the Office of Administrative Procedure when faced with any procedural
problems under these sections. Upon sufficient notice hearing officers
can be furnished to a district upon request. Requests for consultation
and for hearing officers should be directed to the nearest regional office
of the Office of Administrative Procedure; there are regional offices in
Sacramento, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Hearing officers are well-
trained and experienced lawyers who conduct hearings for more than
fifty-five state licensing agencies, including the State Board of Educa-
tion and the State Personnel Board.
Hearings conducted by hearing officers are formal in nature. They
are not of the "let's-sit-down-around-the-table-and-talk-this-over" va-
riety. There are several reasons for this. Presumably the parties have
exhausted all possibilities of resolving the controversy through informal
mehods. A teacher whose future in education may be at stake is en-
titled to a formal, serious, legal proceeding. Moreover informality leads
inevitably to a bad record which may well be the cause for reversal
of the board's decision by the superior court on a writ of mandate.
The teacher should have counsel and both the teacher's and the board's
counsel should prepare themselves for exactly the same type of trial
they would expect in the courts. Also they should carefully read and
be thoroughly versed on the Administrative Procedure Act," s espe-
cially section 11513(c), dealing with evidence." 9
11 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11517.
118 CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 11500-28; Bobby, An Introduction to Practice and Procedure
Under the California Administrative Procedure Act, 15 HASTiNGS L.J. - (1964) (this
issue).
119 See Note, Hearsay Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 HASINGs L.J.
- (1964) (this issue).
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What are the issues to be tried at the hearing? It has been sug-
gested that the only issue to be tried is the question of whether the
reasons stated for the dismissal relate solely to the welfare of the school
and the pupils thereof. 12 0 But if this were correct, it would seem that
no evidence in support of factual allegations in the accusation need be
introduced at the hearing. However, as we have seen, the words of
Education Code section 13444 stating that "the determination of the
Board as to the sufficiency of the cause for dismissal shall be conclu-
sive," and that "the determination of the board as to the sufficiency of
the cause for dismissal shall not be subject to judicial review," simply
mean that the court will not substitute its judgment for the board's dis-
cretion in determining sufficiency of the cause, so long as it relates
solely to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof.12 1 Moreover,
as was also pointed out above, it is within the traditional power of a
court hearing a petition for writ of mandate to reverse a decision of an
administrative agency if there is not substantial evidence to support
the agency's findings. It is submitted that there is nothing in the dis-
missal statutes to suggest a legislative intent to curtail this traditional
power. Clearly then, substantial evidence must be introduced as to the
factual issues raised by the accusation.
22
Whether such a hearing benefits a teacher is questionable. He
may, in fact, seriously damage his opportunity to obtain employment
in another district. By the time the board has made a determination
not to rehire a teacher, it has presumably discussed the matter at some
length with the teacher's immediate supervisor and the superintendent;
and, presumably, the board would not proceed with the dismissal ac-
tion unless the administration and the board members believed that
good cause existed and could be proved. Thus the chances of a hearing
resulting in a finding in favor of the teacher are infinitesimal. Having
made up their minds in executive session in the absence of the teacher,
the board members could hardly be expected to reverse themselves in
the formal proceeding under the Administrative Procedure Act. No
case has been brought to the writer's attention where a board has re-
versed itself and retained the teacher. The result of the hearing is a
formal written decision spelling out the teacher's deficiencies. This is
a public record which will follow the teacher wherever he may apply
for a new position. Yet, in fact, the teacher might well be able to do
an effective teaching job in another school district.
120 See 39 CAL. Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 186, 191 (1962).
1L2 See note 102 supra, and accompanying text.
122 Griggs v. Board of Trustees, 61 A.C. - , 37 Cal. Rptr. 194, - P.2d
(March 1964).
Feb., 1964] PROBATIONARY TEACHERS
